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To say what “fundamentality” means, we have to start by approaching what we generally see 
at  the  empty  place  of  the  predicate  “____  is  fundamental”.  We  generally  talk  about 
fundamental entities and fundamental theories. At this article, I tried to make a metaphysical 
approach of what is for something to be fundamental, and I also tried to talk a little bit of 
fundamental incomplete and complete theories. To do that, I start stating the notion of “entity” 
and looking at the difference at perceived entities. The difference led us to talk about the 
entities’ structures and their powers, and about the supervenience between these last two. The 
supervenience talk made us to see the fight between emergentism and reductionism as the 
difference between the irreducibility of laws and the reducibility of powers and structures to 
lower-order domains. Then, we conclude that “fundamentality” is a mereological relation – a 
relation that a whole structure has to a certain combination of its structural parts or that a 
power has to a certain combination of its constituent powers – of to be identical and to exist in 
virtue of them. 
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Difference at the entities – structures and powers
An entity is something that must be encountered in the space and something that is 
manifested through its powers. A power is a potentiality of an entity that becomes effective 
when the right conditions are met. For example, a human being is an entity because he is 
something encountered in the space and something manifested through its powers – colors, 
textures, smells, hardness, solubility etc. When we see two different human beings, we ask 
ourselves about the reason of this difference. If there are similar external conditions where 
both human beings are, and no relevant difference at the observer perceptive apparatus, we 
have to think that the difference at the perceived powers come from a difference at something 
intrinsic to the entity. We have to think that there is something that if the perceived powers 
change, it also change. And this “something” is the entity’s structure (because there is no 
other thing to be).
When we analyze an entity without paying attention to its powers, we just have its 
structure. To imagine it better: try to think about hydrogen as a sphere and about oxygen as a 
cube. So, a hydrogen is a sphere with some powers, and an oxygen is a cube with some 
powers. Then, structurally, or better, without attention to the powers, a molecule of H2O is just 
two spheres in a certain relation (relation X) to a cube. The structure, and not the powers, is 
met in the space. Because the space where the powers present themselves is in the same space 
where  the  structure  is,  but  they  are  different  from  the  structure.  Thus,  backing  to  the 
difference subject,  if something is structurally H2O (a cube X-related to two spheres) and 
present the powers of to be transparent and to dissolve salt, if there is another entity that is not 
transparent or that does not dissolve salt, it is rational to think that there is a difference at its 
structure.
As the structure can be encountered in the space and the powers cannot,  they are 
different; and, therefore, the entity must be seen in two ways: structurally and in its powers. 
But if it is so, we have to explain the relation between structures and powers, and the relation 
between an entity and its structures and powers. That is what I am going to do now.
Laws of nature, intrinsic powers, and supervenience
When we divide an entity within structure and powers,  we have to explain why a 
certain structure manifests  a  certain power.  For example,  why the structure of  a  cube X-
related to two spheres manifests the power of high solubility for salt? There are two answers 
for that: (i) there are laws of nature that make a certain kind of structure to manifest a certain 
kind of power, or that (ii) the kind of manifested powers are intrinsic to that kind of structure. 
Both approaches are problematic: they have to explain, the first, what is a law of nature, and 
the second, what is “intrinsic”. What both answers seem to maintain is that the powers of an 
entity are supervenient on its structure, or on its structure together with the laws of nature. It  
means that there cannot be a difference within an entity powers without a difference within 
the entity structure or also within the laws of nature – if we use the laws of nature’s approach. 
Of course, it does not mean the reciprocal is true: different structures can present the same 
powers.
I rather prefer to use the laws of nature’s thesis because (a) it gets clearer what I want 
to say, (b) because I do not want to postulate infinite potentialities to the structures, and (c) 
because talking about intrinsic powers – or better, dispositions – do not explain why there are 
any disposition at all. If I say that structures have intrinsic powers, I would have to say that 
the structures have intrinsic powers for each kind of ambient they could exist in; and thus 
these powers would be infinite. This is not a complete justification of the preference for the 
laws of nature, but it will not be a problem. If through an argument someone reduces the laws 
of nature to intrinsic powers, the only thing we must do then is to adequate the theory I am 
exposing here to intrinsic powers’ talk.
Thus, I must say that the powers are supervenient on the structures and on the laws of 
nature.  Or  better,  two  entities  structure-indiscernible  at  alike  conditions  are  powers-
indiscernible at alike conditions. These conditions are the ambient and the laws of nature. As 
powers supervene on structures and are different from them, we have to pay attention to the 
relation between them as to discover their nature. 
If we try to establish an interaction between a power and a structure, it will not make 
any sense. For example, the cubes and spheres that H2O structurally are cannot interact with 
the power of to be a liquid substance; it can only interact with structures of the same order 
(atoms with atoms, molecules with molecules, and so on) and of the same mode (structure or 
power).  But  the  power  of  to  be  a  liquid  substance  can  interact  to  the  power of  freezing 
substances that the structure of a freezer has. Structures can only interact to structures, and 
powers can only interact to powers; although powers are supervenient on structures together 
with the conditions (plus laws). And if, for example, from the interaction of the powers of the 
water and the powers of the freezer, the water becomes ice (it means that a combination of  
powers  modified  the  entity’s  powers);  and,  in  the  same  time,  a  change  occurred  at  its 
structure.  It  is  a  kind  of  parallelism  between  structures  and  powers,  and  between 
mereological-orders (atoms do not interact to molecules, they only interact to atoms). Thus, if 
there cannot be interaction between structures and powers, although powers occur within an 
entity’s structure without occupying its space, powers have a different nature of the structures. 
But what is the nature of a structure?
The structures as wholes, the mereological supervenience and the problem of emergents
A structure is a whole that can or cannot be made of proper parts. A proper part is a 
part that is not identical to the whole. For example, 10 ml of water is a structure made of lots 
of molecules of H2O together in a certain relation. The molecules of H2O and its relation are 
proper parts of the 10 ml of water. Also each molecule of H2O is a structure and wholes made 
of proper parts. H2O is a structure made of a certain relation between two atoms of hydrogen 
and  one  atom  of  oxygen.  Thus,  10  ml  of  water  is  made  of  a  certain  relation  between 
complexes of atoms.
But what does “to be made of” means? There are two senses we can understand it: (1) 
as the materials an entity presents itself in, and (2) as the identity between the whole and its  
proper parts. I understand it here as (2). So, the conjunction of the structural proper parts of a 
whole  together  with  the  non-structural  proper  part  of  that  whole  –  the  relation  that  the 
structural parts have to be the whole – is the whole. Therefore, it cannot be a change in the 
whole  without  a  change  in  the  proper  parts,  or  better,  the  whole  is  supervenient  on  the 
conjunction of its proper parts. And as the conjunction of all the proper parts is the whole,  
“the conjunction of all proper parts being supervenient on the whole” is true. If this is so, the 
whole is reducible to the conjunction of its proper parts. 
Not  everybody  would  accept  such  a  claim  without  restrictions.  There  are  some 
philosophers called “emergentists” that would deny that the whole is always reducible to its 
parts. Nevertheless, I think that position arises from a mess between powers and structures, 
and from an intuition that the sum of the parts is not always equal to the whole; for example, 
when the powers of the whole are not any power of its structural proper parts. Some power 
emerges from the whole and it is not in any of its parts. This thesis is generally used to defend 
the existence of some powers that are claimed to be emergent, as the life or the mentality, and 
to  defend  that  the  reality  is  organized  in  orders  of  existents  with  its  own  laws.  Other 
arguments for the emergentist position are the unpredictability argument and the argument for 
the impossibility of deduction. The first say that we can only predicate an emergent power to 
an entity if it is already instantiated at a higher-order whole, and the other say that we cannot 
deduce from the lower-order parts and its regulative lower-order laws the higher-order powers 
and laws.
My argument to counter the emergentists is to say that a sum is not a conjunction, and 
that  the  parts  they are  talking  are  only the  structural  proper  parts,  they generally do not 
include the relation between the proper parts. The structural proper parts without the relation 
are not comparable to the whole. A sum of all structural proper parts is not the conjunction of 
all – structural and non-structural – proper parts. It is not a conjunction because a sum of parts 
can only be thought as parts  together  side by side,  and a conjunction is  something more 
interactive.
But I agree in part with the unpredictability and the impossible-deduction arguments. 
Of course we can only predicate a specific x-order power to an entity of the x-order. In this 
sense all  predicates are emergent.  It only shows us that the powers emerge from a whole 
structure, or better, from the relation of the entity’s structural proper parts (together with the 
laws of nature and the ambient), and not from the sum of the structural proper parts – if those 
entities  are  made  of  proper  parts.  And  this  answer  leads  us  to  the  impossible-deduction 
argument. As a law connecting molecules is in fact a law connecting complexes of atoms, we 
cannot understand why we cannot deduce that a relation between complexes of atoms will 
present  some  specific  power  based  on  laws  of  the  relation  of  atomic  complexes.  The 
emergentist can say that although a structure can be reduced to the relation of its proper parts, 
the laws of wholes cannot be reduced to laws about the parts. Again, we do not understand 
why this impossibility is relevant to the emergentist. Laws are not reducible because they treat 
of x-order specific kinds of entities. All laws are emergent, in the unpredictability sense. But 
we can reduce the entities from those laws to a conjunction of its proper parts and think it as a  
law about complexes of lower-order entities. Thus, we can assume there are emergent powers 
and laws (all powers and laws), but not that these emergents cannot be analyzed in terms of 
lower-order entities and, therefore, reduced.
If we analyze only the powers we can also see that: a power, as a structure, is the 
conjunction of its components of lower-order. For example, the power of “to be liquid as 
water” that arises from 10 ml of water is a conjunction of the powers of each molecule of  
H2O. Since there is a conjunction of powers and a law of nature indicating the power that will  
be that conjunction, a power can be analyzed in terms of a conjunction of its component 
powers plus laws.
So, there are two relations of supervenience: a whole is supervenient on its proper 
parts and the powers are supervenient on its structure. It means there cannot be a change in 
entity’s powers without a change in its structure. It is saying that there cannot be two objects 
indiscernible at their structures and discernible at their powers, if they are at same conditions. 
The whole/proper-parts supervenience is wider than a mere covariance. The whole is identical 
to its proper parts, or components, whether we talk about structures, or we talk about powers. 
The laws are the only ones we could not reduce as the emergentist would like it, but it is not 
an argument against reductionism, because the intrinsic nature of a law is to be a law that rule 
over  certain kinds  of  variables.  It  is  not  an argument  against  reductionism because if  we 
reduce the variables the laws are ruling to proper parts variables, we will achieve a law of the 
lowest-order  entities;  although it  is  a  law about  complexes  of  such lower-order  entity.  A 
complete theory of our lowest-order entities – of its structure and powers – would have laws 
about all fundamental entities and about their complexes.
Fundamentality as reducibility and identity between the whole and its parts
I hope our reductionist talk helps us to understand what fundamentality is. When we 
say “is fundamental”, we generally apply such predicate to entities (structures and powers) 
and theories.  Theories  are  methodic descriptions of  structures,  powers  and laws from the 
reality. To apply such a predicate to one of these things is to say that they are fundamental.  
But what means “to be fundamental”?
Fundamentality  is  a  certain  relation  that  a  whole  has  to  its  proper  parts  of  to  be 
reducible to them. And to be reducible to its proper parts, here, is to be identical and to exist 
in virtue of its proper parts. The powers of a molecule exist in virtue of the conjunction of the 
powers of its proper parts (together with the ambient and the laws of nature), and they are 
identical to the conjunction of the proper parts’ powers. It is similar for powers, structures,  
and theories. If we can talk about the entities of a theory in terms of these entities’ proper 
parts, we are reducing such a theory to a more fundamental theory. A higher-order theory 
would  be  only  a  part  of  the  lowest-order  theory,  and  a  higher-order  theory would  have 
identical constituents to some part of the lowest-order theory: the possibility of the existence 
of a higher-order theory can only occur in virtue of the possibility of the existence of the 
lowest-order  theory.  Every  time  we  reduce  something,  we  reduce  it  to  something  more 
fundamental. We will talk a little later about theories.
Let’s talk now about this “more fundamental”. Reducibility, as supervenience, that is a 
demand of reducibility, is a transitive relation. It means that if A is reducible to B, and B is 
reducible to C, then A is reducible to C. If we see the organization of the entities of reality in 
levels of reducible entities, we would be allowed to talk about more fundamental entities. And 
we are allowed to do that since there are reducible complexes of entities and non-reducible 
laws – at emergentist sense of “non-reducible”. They are not reducible because they have to 
talk about the variable they talk; but they are reducible if we think them as laws of the most  
fundamental complete theory. To be the most fundamental theory, structure, or power is to be 
an irreducible theory, structure, or power.
 Complete and incomplete theories
A fundamental theory is a theory about fundamental powers, structures and laws. A 
complete theory is a theory that talks about all powers, structures and laws. The complete 
most fundamental theory would be a theory that talks about all most fundamental powers, 
structures and laws. Such a theory would contain all the fundamental structures and powers, 
and their complexes, and all laws for their relations and manifestations. Such a theory would 
be a mirror of the most fundamental level of reality.
But when emergentists say, for example, that sociology cannot be reduced to physics, 
they are not referring to the complete most fundamental theory. They are talking about the 
incomplete theories we have at present days. The emergentist is seeing the present physics as 
the most fundamental science – because it tries to talk about the most fundamental entities – 
and saying that from the laws and entities of present physics, we cannot achieve a deduction 
of higher-order powers and laws. We can agree with that. Present physics is not a complete 
theory about the most fundamental entities. Until now, it never discovered which entities are 
the fundamental ones. The emergentist argument should target complete physics, and not the 
incomplete one. But if complete physics has all the fundamental entities, its complexes, and 
its laws, all other theories would be deduced from physics. In fact, complete sociology for 
example would be only a branch of complete physics, because it would be a talk about how 
some kind of complexes of fundamental entities socio-relate to each other. So, the complete 
physics would be the most fundamental theory, or better, the irreducible theory.
Present physics cannot be the target of emergentists, because it does not intend to give 
an approach of all laws, and all complexes of structures and of powers. The specialization of  
sciences makes our present scientific practice in levels – each present science studies certain 
complexes  of  fundamental  entities  in  a  certain  manner  –  and  it  makes  that  for  achieve 
complete physics we would have to unite all complete sciences, taking into account they are 
sciences  of  complexes  of the most  fundamental  particles.  But if  we accept  that  there are 
emergents that  would be ruled by laws outside the complete  physics,  or  better,  to accept 
ontological  emergence,  it  would be to  deny that  the causal  physical  determinism obtains; 
problem that my theory does not have. All I have said is compatible with determinism. We can 
only think emergence as compatible with determinism if we say things like “powers emerge 
from structures and laws” not in the sense that they are not in complete physics, but thinking 
“emerge” as “arise from”. Thus,  causality and determinism got preserved,  and all  powers 
become emergents.  Or,  by thinking “an emergent” as an irreducible  law, making all  laws 
emergents; what also preserves causality and determinism. So, the few theses the emergentist 
can sustain are consistent with our reductionist approach.
Dualism: structures and the power of mentality
A real emergentist seems to try to preserve the distinct nature of some powers from a 
structure, such as mentality. But since we have an ontology that says to us that entities are 
structures and powers, and that powers have a different nature from structures – only these 
last  ones  are  met  in  the  space,  while  the  former  are  not  –  we cannot  find  a  substantial  
difference, for example, between the power of being yellow and the power of being a mind. 
Both have not spatial location; both supervene on some physical structure and arise from it. 
They both seem powers that arise from structures. They both have the same mystery of the 
power emergence. This happens also with other powers, as “to be alive”, and maybe with all 
the others. Remembering that the mystery we have to solve is how a structure presents powers 
at all.
As we had saw, dualism about brain and mind can be defended naturalistically if we 
accept a dualism about structures and powers. Thus, the mind would seem a power that arises 
from a brain-structure. But, at least,  this supervenience dualism about entities seems more 
reasonable then a strong monism about them, and it is still part of a naturalistic project that 
intends  to  place  the  mind,  and all  other  structures’ powers,  as  variables  of  the  complete 
naturalistic physical theory. 
Conclusion
The intent of this article was to explain what fundamentality is within concrete objects. 
I called the concrete objects “entities”. As the difference within perceived powers of an entity 
alike in conditions led us to a difference at the entity’s spatial part, we have to postulate that  
entities are structures and powers.
As we saw, structures and powers organize themselves at levels of existents and can 
only relate  themselves  with structures  and powers  of  the  same level  (or  order),  although 
powers only relate to powers and structures only relate to structures. It is a kind of parallelism 
between  structures  and powers.  The parallelism also  obtains  in  the  case  of  the  levels  of 
existents (mereological-orders). It happens the same thing at the whole made of molecules 
and at the complex made of atoms that occupy the same space of whole made of molecules. It  
is also true for the powers and for the relation of its constituent powers.
If this is so, the whole is the conjunction of its proper parts, and “fundamentality” is 
the relation of “to be reducible”. That is the relation that a whole has to its proper parts of to 
be identical and of to exist in virtue of its proper parts. Thus, “the absolute fundamentality” – 
to be the most fundamental – would be “irreducibility”. And this is true for spatial (structural)  
and non-spatial (powers) parts from the concrete entities.
As I said, the entity dualism here asserted propitiate the dualism at the mind-brain 
problem, but at least explain what fundamentality is, and makes all powers, that are all non-
spatial, to become physical and natural objects of study; what is a physicalist and a naturalist 
approach of the concrete entities. Nevertheless, I cannot explain here what a law of nature is. 
But it is not an insoluble problem, since we can modify the supervenience dualism to accept a 
clearer notion than a law of nature. Since we still do not have that clear notion, and since I 
still do not know where to place the law of nature or whether there is any law of nature at all,  
I  cannot  talk  about  fundamental  categories  here.  However,  putting  the  laws  aside,  the 
fundamental categories within physical objects – and there are only physical objects – would 
be to be a structure and to be a power.
References
BATTERMAN, Robert. 2008, “Intertheory Relations in Physics”.  Stanford Encyclopedia of  
Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta, ed., URL =  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/ 
physics-interrelate/ 
BRIGANDT,  Ingo  and  LOVE,  Alan.  2008,  “Reductionism  in  Biology”.  The  Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta, ed., URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
fall2008/entries/reduction-biology/
HELLMAN,  Geoffrey  and  THOMPSON,  Frank.  2006,  “Physicalism:  Ontology, 
Determination,  and  Reduction”,  in:  KIM,  Jaegwon  and  SOSA,  Ernst.  Metaphysics:  an 
anthology. 8a ed. Malden: Blackwell, pp. 531-539.
KIM, Jaegwon. 2006, “Multiple Realization and the Metaphsycis of Reduction”. In: KIM, 
Jaegwon and SOSA, Ernst.  Metaphysics: an anthology. 8a ed. Malden: Blackwell, pp. 515-
530.
______. 2006, “Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept”. In: KIM, Jaegwon and SOSA, 
Ernst. Metaphysics: an anthology. 8a ed. Malden: Blackwell, pp. 540-556.
MCLAUGHLIN,  Brian  and  BENNETT,  Karen.  2008,  “Supervenience”.  The  Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta, ed., URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
fall2008/entries/supervenience/
SCHAFFER, Jonathan. 2008, “Monism”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward 
N. Zalta, ed., URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/monism/
STEPHAN, Achim. 2007, “Emergentism, irreducibility,  and downward causation”.  Grazer  
Philosophische Studien: vol. 65, pp. 77-93.
STOLJAR, Daniel. 2008, “Physicalism”.  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward 
N. Zalta, ed., URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/physicalism/
VARZI, Achille. 2008, “Mereology”.  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. 
Zalta, ed., URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/mereology/
